This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, (...) the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call ‘first person self-knowledge’, i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be ‘first-person self-knowledge’ is really just ‘third-person self-knowledge,’ i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge. (shrink)

Patrizia Pedrini | : In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception suffer from a problem of restrictedness that does not do justice to the complexities of the phenomenon. In particular, I argue that the very search for a paradigmatic state of self-deception greatly overlooks the dynamic dimension of the self-deceptive process, which allows the inclusion of more mental states than paradigmatic-state accounts consider. I will discuss the inadequacy of any such accounts, and I will argue (...) that we should replace them with a dynamic view of self-deception that is more liberal regarding the mental states in which self-deceivers may find themselves. | : Dans cet article, je soutiens que les explications de l’auto-illusion en termes d’un état « paradigmatique » souffrent d’un problème de limitation qui ne rend pas justice à la complexité du phénomène. Plus précisément, j’avance que la recherche même d’un état paradigmatique néglige tout à fait la dimension dynamique du processus d’auto-illusion, de sorte à inclure davantage d’états mentaux que ne le font les explications en termes d’un état paradigmatique. Après avoir démontré l’insuffisance de ces dernières, je proposerai que nous devrions les remplacer par une conception dynamique de l’auto-illusion qui serait plus flexible quant aux états mentaux potentiellement vécus par des personnes sous l’emprise de l’auto-illusion. (shrink)

Is it possible to develop a personal narrative that is not fictitious or self-deceptive? In this essay, I will look at the way that personal narratives contribute to self-deception. In so doing, I will consider the narrative that the narrator or pastor of André Gide’s Pastoral Symphonie develops while reflecting upon his romantic relationship with his blind adopted “daughter”, Gertrude. Although the pastor’s narrative is largely self-deceptive, we need not fear that all narratives are equally delusional. When a narrative is (...) not self-deceptive, it can make a positive contribution to self-knowledge and moral understanding. (shrink)

This essay looks at the important, but often neglected, contribution that self‐interpretation makes to emotional self‐knowledge. We engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (A) we try to understand what it is that we are feeling, or, relatedly, what it is that we ought to be feeling. On such occasions, we draw upon social and personal narratives as well as on the emotional conceptual repertoires at our disposal. We also engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (B) we try to ascertain the (...) meaning or significance of an emotion, treating it as a datum, or piece of evidence, upon which to make inferences or further Interpretations. Although we often seem to have first‐person privileged access to our mental states, the third‐person strategy of self‐interpretation can be a valuable source of self‐knowledge. I focus here upon the role that self‐interpretation plays in providing us with knowledge about our emotional experiences. (shrink)

According to the principle known as “the principle of present-tense ascription immunity”, “It is impossible for anyone to have or entertain thoughts without being aware—immediately and self-evidently—that he is thinking that thought”. In other words, my thoughts are fundamentally experienced as mine, and I typically have this experience of mineness immediately, that is, without any inference based on evidence about who is the thinker of the thought. Thought insertion reveals instead that, under particular pathological conditions, people can be startlingly in (...) error about who is thinking a thought. How can this happen? In the attempt to specify how the capacity for self-ascription of a thought can.. (shrink)

Life is so wretched that it would be impossible to endure were it not for the luminous beams of illusion that guide us through its darkest moments. Many argue, perhaps not to this degree, that were it not for some modest illusions about the world and ourselves we would experience a serious decline in quality of life. On those not-so-good days, this claim strikes me as irresistible. How would I endure life and maintain my sanity if I had to embrace (...) each and every disgusting and disheartening fact about the world? Perceiving the world in a way that is neither clear-eyed nor complete may not be without its advantages. But even if being mistaken about the world or self-deceived causes one to be healthier or more comfortable, it is worth asking whether there is something to be said against a life of this kind. Might there not be some knowledge about ourselves or the world that we ought to have? Do not these ‘positive illusions,’ or flattering but inaccurate beliefs that people have about themselves and the world, interfere with their ability to live the good life? In the first part of this paper, I will briefly review the psychological literature which suggests that mild self-deception in the positive direction contributes to, rather than compromises, a person’s well-being. I will then, in the second part of the paper, examine what three thinkers, Joseph Butler, Immanuel Kant, and W.K. Clifford, have said about the wrongfulness of self-deception. While their arguments call attention to various reasons for thinking that some cases of self-deception might give rise on balance to negative consequences, they fail to show that all cases must have this effect. In the final part of the paper, I will consider whether our interest in autonomy might provide us with a better explanation of the supposed wrongfulness of self-deception. I will try to show that in virtue of being mistaken alone, the self-deceiver generally experiences some loss of a particular kind of autonomy. Nevertheless, my analysis will leave open the following two possibilities: that the loss of autonomy was autonomously brought about, and that the loss of autonomy in question may result on balance in an increase in the self-deceiver’s autonomy. (shrink)

Is abortion a question of personal morality? Liberals and feminists often embrace this idea, but so also do those who are personally opposed to abortion. Someone may claim to believe personally that abortion is wrong without holding the corresponding public belief. I am interested in what exactly one means when one says that abortion is a question of personal morality. In Sec. II, I consider three influential interpretations of the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality. After showing (...) that each of these interpretations is inadequate, I develop a fourth that avoids some of the problems with the first three (in Sec. III). But even on this interpretation, the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality is difficult to defend. This is because we cannot show that abortion is a question of personal morality without first knowing something about the moral status of the fetus. I conclude the paper with some pessimistic remarks concerning our ability to arrive at a compromise position on abortion. (shrink)

In Morality and Global Justice, Michael Boylan presents us with a set of solutions to some of the world’s most pressing moral issues. Boylan claims that his solutions are not utopian; instead, they are practical, workable policy recommendations that governments and other organizations should adopt. For the most part, Boylan is correct; there are no obviously insurmountable obstacles to implementing many of his recommendations. But, as he himself admits, his position on immigrants and refugees borders on the utopian (Boylan 2011, (...) 204). In what follows, I will discuss two concerns that I have about his position. The first concern (1) is consequentialist: I fear that implementing a policy of open borders may lead to economic, environmental, and political consequences that are on balance undesirable. The second (2) is practical: even if American citizens have moral reasons for supporting a policy of open borders, they may have reasons of self-interest for rejecting it. If this is correct, then Boylan may have a difficult time garnering the support necessary to make the policy a reality. (shrink)

Are citizens responsible for their own bad epistemic conduct? What grounds do we have for such accountability practice? And what if citizens lack education and knowledge on how evidence should be considered and thus acted upon? Does ignorance of this kind excuse them, or are there still normative margins for legitimately holding them accountable? In this paper, I wish to chart the legitimate options that we have for our practice of moral accountability in the epistemic domain, in particular the one (...) which pertains to the institutional role of citizens. In order to fulfil the task, I will resort to an analysis of what it takes to meet the standards of an institutional role, what capacities are required, and what duties we incur. The analysis will show that a certain number of capacities are required in order to perform within an institutional role, and that role-occupants are not exempt from a duty of care regarding the state of their own capacities. This is a duty which pertains to most institutional roles, and citizens qua institutional role-occupants are no exception. Institutions have a role to play; they should educate citizens not only by offering suitable chances to acquire specific capacities and knowledge of evidence treatment, but also, conjunctively and constitutively, by helping them to enhance the conscience and care pertaining to the role. This can be effectively done by more clearly defining the standards of epistemic conduct imperative to the institutional role of citizens, as well as illustrating its moral significance in-depth. (shrink)

I thank Dr. Matthew Parrott and Dr. V.Y. Allison-Bolger very much for their valuable comments on my paper. They have given me the chance to reflect further on the account of thought insertion I propose, and I respond to them with enthusiasm. I also thank the Editor of this journal for arranging this discussion and for giving me the opportunity to reply. Both Dr. Parrott and Dr. Allison-Bolger are concerned about whether my account is fundamentally tenable. They suggest that I (...) make two incompatible claims in the paper: I deny that a schizophrenic thinker suffering from thought insertion has the appropriate dispositions to enter the cause/reason-giving practice for the thought that she... (shrink)

In this contribution I offer an analysis of some specific theses defended by Ceva and Ferretti (2021). First, I raise a question related to the theoretical work done by the sabotage of an institution’s raison d’être when both describing and morally evaluating political corruption. In particular, I will ask whether the ultimate moral reason why corruption is a moral wrong rests on the sabotage of the raison d’être that it entails and to which it could be con-substantially tied. Relatedly, I (...) will explore whether the sabotage of an institution’s raison d’être can be described without that particular cause-effect relationship which is the relationship between action and its consequences, and if the relation holds, whether we can still guarantee the constitutivist account of the moral agent that the authors favor. The second question I pose concerns the deficit of “office accountability” which according to the authors would be at the heart of the moral wrong of which political corruption consists. I will wonder whether this deficit is sufficient to capture political corruption, although it is certainly a necessary manifestation of it. Finally, I will argue that in order to grasp the phenomenon of political corruption not only should we look at intra-institutional relations, but also at the inter-institutional ones. A succinct appendix on the common sense semantics of the adjective “corrupt” completes my commentary. (shrink)

According to a recent theory of the motivational content of self-deception, the self-deceiver wants to be in a state of mind of belief that p, upon which her want that p be true would be merely contingent. While I agree with Funkhouser that the self-deceiver is considerably moved by an interest in believing that p, which makes it possible for her to relate to reality in a highly prejudiced way, I will argue that it is unlikely that the self-deceiver’s primary (...) want to believe, or interest in believing that p occurs as the result of a merely contingent interest in p being true. I will finally assess various consequences of the view I favor, regarding the self-deceiver’s avoidance behaviour, “twisted” self-deception, and whether we should provide a unifying account of “straight” and “twisted” self-deception. (shrink)

Does self-deception constitute a threat to the distinguishing kind of rationality human beings enjoy? I propose a compromise between the deflationary solutions to the alleged puzzles selfdeception has long been taken to give rise to and some virtues of the competing account -namely, the intentionalist view. In order to fulfil the task, I argue as to precisely what is left to blame in self-deception once we have made sense of why intentionalism fails to capture the nature of the phenomenon.

John McDowell and Christine Korsgaard have defended the claim that when human beings judge or believe that p, they are exercising a fundamental kind of freedom, the “freedom of judging.” David Owens has challenged the view: he argues that they offer us at best no more than a modest notion of freedom, which does not vindicate the claim that we are free in many relevant instances of judgment, in particular in perceptual judgment. I argue that Owens is right if we (...) view the freedom of judgment along the lines of McDowell’s and Korsgaard’s proposals – as being a form of freedom which is describable as “freedom of choosing between alternatives,” but that that is not the only option available. In order to secure the nexus between reason and freedom, we can exploit a quite distinct model of freedom, which is the “freedom of autonomy.”. (shrink)

Achille Varzi è uno dei maggiori metafisici viventi. Nel corso degli anni ha scritto testi fondamentali di logica, metafisica, mereologia, filosofia del linguaggio. Ha sconfinato nella topologia, nella geografia, nella matematica, ha ragionato di mostri e confini, percezione e buchi, viaggi nel tempo, nicchie, eventi e ciambelle; e non ha disdegnato di dialogare con gli abitanti di Flatlandia, con Neo e con Terminator. Tra le sue opere principali: Holes and Other Superficialities e Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, (...) entrambi scritti insieme a R. Casati per MIT Press; Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza; e il suo libro più recente: Le tribolazioni del filosofare, con C. Calosi, per Laterza. -/- Da una giornata all’Università di Urbino nasce questa conversazione a molte voci sulla e con la filosofia di Achille C. Varzi. In un dialogo critico al quale l’Autore si presta con generosità e onestà intellettuale, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Calemi, Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Pierluigi Graziani, Patrizia Pedrini, Daniele Santoro e Giuliano Torrengo lo interrogano e mettono alla prova sui temi affrontati, nel corso degli anni, in campi diversi. Il risultato è un percorso che si snoda attraverso molti mondi, dalla logica alla metafisica, dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla mereologia alla filosofia del tempo, spingendosi in qualche caso oltre i confini del saggio filosofico. (shrink)

Among the various issues in Global Justice that I address in Morality and Global Justice: Justifications and Applications (2011-a), international immigration is one of the most important. Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez and Julie Kirsch have written sensitive queries about my position that I will address in order.

The discussion about the relationship between tone at the top and financial reporting practices has been primarily focused on the oversight role played by the board of directors and other structural elements of corporate governance. Another relevant determinant of tone at the top is the corporate narrative language, since it is a fundamental way in which the chief executive officer enacts leadership. In this study, we empirically explore the association between financial reporting aggressiveness and five thematic indicators capturing different traits (...) of ethical leadership from 535 annual letters to shareholders. We find that aggressive financial reporting is positively associated with CEO letters using a language which is resolute, complex, and not engaging. Our empirical findings highlight the importance of examining discretionary corporate narratives for the auditing process and the role of tone at the top in influencing accounting practices. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the sincerity of the rhetorical tone of 664 annual letters to shareholders (CEO letters). Prior studies adopt Impression Management theory to predict that firms obfuscate failures and emphasize successes to unfairly enhance their image and maintain organizational legitimacy. Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) challenged such a view, showing that firms reporting earnings surprises engage in ethical discourse with shareholders. We adopt the methodology of Yuthas et al. (J Bus Ethics 41:141–157, 2002) to (...) explore the association between firm performance and the rhetorical features of CEO letters in a large sample of Fortune 500 firms in the wake of the global economic crisis. In contrast to most prior research, we find that optimistic tone is congruent with both past and future performance. We conclude that under tough macroeconomic conditions, incentives to distort public information strategically are low. Rather, firms tend to engage in communicative action aimed at dialoguing with shareholders through sincere disclosure. However, in our conclusions, we warn about the impact of accounting and rhetorical manipulation on the congruence between optimistic tone and financial performance. (shrink)

Drawing on interviews with women and men who serve on the supervisory boards of German stock-listed companies, this qualitative study examines why some female directors seek to augment gender equality in their organizations while others do not. Those who take action do so both in formal board processes and in informal settings. A sense of belonging to women as a social group and a sense of responsibility for women in the organization are key factors in explaining why some female directors (...) contribute to gender equality. In addition, the study highlights the relevance of a board culture supportive of gender equality and positive expectations by other organizational members about female directors’ role in advancing gender equality. Board chairs influence how supportive female directors perceive the organizational context to be. Where the organizational context is not seen as supportive, those who take equality-related action anyway are experienced directors. Surprisingly, the presence of other women on the board does not appear to be related to whether or not female directors take action. Examining female directors’ actions and paying close attention to both their identities and their specific organizational settings shows how the interplay between social identity and situational opportunities and constraints affects board behavior. (shrink)

Childress et al. (2023) describe a disagreement between the competent patient and the physician recommending withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy (WLST). While the scenario is specific to ECMO, th...

This book builds on the vast clinical experience of Joseph L. Henderson, who became interested in initiatory symbolism when he began his analysis with Jung in 1929. Henderson studied this symbolism in patients' dreams, fantasies, and active imagination, and demonstrated the archetype of initiation in both men and women's psychology. After Henderson’s book was republished in 2005 Kirsch, Beane Rutter and Singer brought together this collection of essays to allow a new generation to explore the archetype of initiation. _Initiation: (...) The Living Reality of an Archetype_ demonstrates how the archetype of initiation is seen clinically today. Divided into distinct parts, the book explores the archetype of initiation in Dr Henderson’s own life, as well as suggesting its importance in: clinical practice culture aging and death. The chapters in this book amplify and extend the archetype of initiation from the earliest historical periods up to the present day. The editors argue that initiation symbolism often underlies contemporary phenomena, but is rarely recognized; _Initiation _helps to bring a new understanding to these experiences. This book will be of interest to psychotherapists with an interest in psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, as well as those training at analytic institutes. (shrink)

_Queer Theory and Social Change_ argues that there is a crisis within Queer theory over whether or not its theories can actually deliver change. Max Kirsch presents a challenging alternative to the current fascination with post-modern analyses of identity, culture, and difference. It emphasizes the need for a discussion of the importance of communities and the role of globalization on queer movements.

_The Jungians: A Comparative and Historical Perspective_ is the first book to trace the history of the profession of analytical psychology from its origins in 1913 until the present. As someone who has been personally involved in many aspects of Jungian history, Thomas Kirsch is well equipped to take the reader through the history of the 'movement', and to document its growth throughout the world, with chapters covering individual geographical areas - the UK, USA, and Australia, to name but (...) a few - in some depth. He also provides new information on the ever-controversial subject of Jung's relationship to Nazism, Jews and Judaism. A lively and well-researched key work of reference, _The Jungians_ will appeal to not only to those working in the field of analysis, but would also make essential reading for all those interested in Jungian studies. (shrink)

Hybrid organisations combine different elements from the for-profit and non-profit domains, and they usually operate in a resource-scarce environment. For these reasons, they continuously face various resources constraints, yet their hybrid nature could be translated into an opportunity. The purpose of our study was to investigate how a hybrid organisation can overcome resource constraints in developing countries by exploiting their own hybrid nature. In the unique research setting offered by Kenyan social enterprises, we identified five creative approaches implemented by social (...) enterprises. Finally, we present a grounded model that clearly explains which hybrid harvesting strategies can be implemented to overcome resource constraints, exploiting their hybrid potential. Our work contributes to knowledge about resource constraints in the social entrepreneurship literature and extends social bricolage theory. Limitations and future research approaches are also presented. (shrink)

Insight is a cognitive feature that is usually regarded as being generated by the neocortex and being present only in humans and possibly some closely related primates. In this essay we show that especially corvids display behavioral skills within the domains of object permanence, episodic memory, theory of mind, and tool use/causal reasoning that are insightful. These similarities between humans and corvids at the behavioral level are probably the result of a convergent evolution. Similarly, the telencephalic structures involved in higher (...) cognitive functions in both species show a high degree of similarity, although the forebrain of birds has no cortex-like lamination. The neural substrate for insight-related cognitive functions in mammals and birds is thus not necessarily based on a laminated cortical structure but can be generated by differently organized forebrains. Hence, neither is insight restricted to mammals, as predicted from a “scala naturae”, nor is the laminated cortex a prerequisite for the highest cognitive functions. (shrink)